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In 1989, Hungary was seen as the 
most market-ready economy in 
eastern Europe. In terms of its per 
capita GDP, however, Hungary is 
yet to catch up to state socialist 
levels even after two decades, 
despite incorporation into the 
European Union and sharply 
increased global and European 
trade fl ows. The privatisation 
of the erstwhile socialist state’s 
property and the dominance of 
western Europe-based capital in 
assembly plant manufacturing 
has meant high import content 
for exports and weak wage and 
subcontracting effects for the 
local economy.
The collapse of state socialism in eastern Europe and northern Eurasia occasioned the outbreak of 
a pandemic of modernisation optimism. 
The fi rst sym ptom was a sudden loss 
of awareness of the complexities of the 
political, economic and geopolitical his-
tories of eastern Europe. Three hyper-
bolic expectations followed. 
First, it came to be widely supposed that 
formal representative democracy would 
congeal the disparate wills and interests of 
various segments of the  region’s societies 
into coherent and legi timate, democratic 
political authorities. Second was the anti-
cipation that “Euro-Atlantic integration” –
membership in both North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) and the European 
Union (EU) – would provide suffi cient 
external stabi lity to the region to assure a 
predictable and prosperous “European” 
future. Fin ally, third, there arose the 
belief that the removal of the institutional 
and organisational features of the state 
socialist system – portrayed only as re-
straints – would give so strong a boost to 
the region’s economies that they would 
“catch up” with western Europe. This last 
hope explains the remarkably peaceful 
character of the transformations.
There is much to be said about the 
multiple theoretical oversights, empirical 
imprecisions, and logical fl aws comprised 
in those expectations. That, however, is 
not my purpose here. In this  paper, I focus 
on how those anticipations withstood 
the empirical test of history, by taking a 
closer look at Hungary, the society that 
was widely regarded, in 1989, as the most 
“market-ready” and “EU-compatible” in 
eastern Europe.
An Empirical Test
As Figure 1 indicates, simply put, Hun-
gary’s post-state socialist history shows 
no sign of catching up in terms of its 
per capita GDP.1 As a matter of fact, no 
other era but the fi rst half of the state 
socialist period shows anything resem-
bling a dynamic upswing, reaching a peak 
around the mid-1970s to early 1980s. The 
post-state socialist period was marked 
by an initial collapse so that, in the fi rst 
three years after 1989, the country’s per 
capita GDP dropped from 135% to 107% 
of the world average (i e, approximately 
10% below its position in 1950), an average 
loss of 9% per annum. The recovery, 
which began in 1995, has yet to bring the 
country back to its position in the last 
year of state socialism 2 – a position that 
was, itself, the result of a decline in the 
preceding decade.3 To place this ambition 
of catching up in context, according to 
Maddison, western Europe had an average 
per capita GDP of approximately 285% 
of the world mean in 2008 – a fi gure 
somewhere between the estimates for 
France and Spain – i e, more than two 
and a half times higher than Hungary’s 
level. Hungary has defi nitely not been 
catching up with western Europe.
Catching up was supposed to be ensured 
by a number of geopolitical and economic 
mechanisms. Inclusion in pan-EU trade 
was supposed to be key among them. 
For the hegemonic intellectual frame-
work at the time – neoclassical econo-
mics – international trade is, ultimately, 
a “win-win situation” for all parties 
involved. That foreign trade is “a driver 
of prosperity” was the position not only 
of the neo-liberal Cato Institute and 
various United States (US) governments,4 
but also, remarkably, of the Commission 
of the EU.5 
With NATO membership sealed in 1999 
and full EU membership accomplished 
in 2004, Hungary was ready to catch 
up through free trade with the west. 
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Figure 1: Hungary’s Per Capita GDP 
(as Percentage of World Mean) Before, During 
and After State Socialism
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Looking at this history in 2012, we are 
now in a position to examine the verity 
of this expectation.
The EU as a whole shows remarkable 
consistency in this regard. During the 
1997-2010 period, the EU’s shares in 
global exports and imports (marked by 
the dashed and dotted lines in Figure 2, 
 respectively) have declined from their 
peak of approximately 21% and 19% in 
1998 to 2010 lows of 17.3% and 16%. The 
EU’s share in gross world product (GWP) 
(indicated by a continuous line in 
 Figure 2) has followed export and  import 
fi gures closely, declining slowly from 
around 20% to about 18% by 2008.6 
Most important for my argument, for the 
EU as a whole, there is a clear link 
 between its shares in global exports and 
imports on the one hand, and its share in 
GWP on the other: the three variables 
are roughly of equal magnitude, and the 
global economic weight moves, by and 
large, together with share in global trade.7
Based on neo-liberal theory, the EU 
Commission’s offi cial expectations and 
empirical data about the EU as a whole, 
we would anticipate a sharp increase in 
Hungary’s foreign trade – particularly 
with full inclusion in the EU in 2004 – 
and, along with it, a steep increase in its 
global economic weight. 
The fi rst half of that empirical expecta-
tion – a sharp increase in Hungary’s foreign 
trade – did happen, although with quite 
a unique and unanticipated temporal 
pattern. As Figure 3 indicates,8 Hungary’s 
participation in world trade had taken 
off already in 1997, the year when formal 
negotiations for EU membership began, 
seven years before membership was 
inaugurated. It reached a local maximum 
(at 0.9% of world  imports and 0.88% of 
world exports) in 2004, the year of full 
EU membership. The ensuing crisis of the 
world economy reduced Hungary’s trade 
fi gures somewhat. But much more striking 
is the fact that, during the period of the up-
swing in Hungary’s participation in world 
trade (marked by an increase from 0.59% 
to 0.97% in exports and 0.51% to 0.93% 
in imports between 1997 and 2007), the 
country’s share in GWP remained practi-
cally fl at. (The curve shows an impercep-
tible increase from 0.35% to 0.38% and 
then a drop to 0.35% during the 14 years 
included in the graphs.) In other words, 
while exports and imports nearly doubled, 
the country’s shares in GWP  remained vir-
tually constant, and at much lower levels 
than the country’s shares in world trade.
Here we have a phenomenon fully un-
anticipated in terms of neo-liberal  theory, 
offi cial EU expectations, and on the basis 
of the overall EU patterns. In the history 
of Hungary’s accession to the EU, steep 
export and import growth failed to gen-
erate a growth in GDP  relative to GWP.
Foreign Trade 
and Income Growth?
It has been known for at least two genera-
tions that the growth of foreign trade 
can fail to generate income growth. As 
Raúl Prebisch and Hans Singer pointed 
out in the 1940s, deteriorating terms of 
trade can destroy the benefi cial effects 
of economic growth under conditions of 
high levels of external trade depen dence. 
A few years later, Jagdish Bhag wati 
(1958: 201) echoed the Prebisch-Singer 
thesis suggesting that: 
“immiserising growth” obtains under con-
ditions where “deterioration in the terms of 
trade [...] offset[s] the benefi cial effect of 
 expansion and reduce[s] the real income of 
the growing country”. 
Developed for what at the time were 
called the economies of the “third world”, 
the original thesis focused on terms of 
trade between agrarian and  industrial 
sectors. Additional work  established that 
disadvantageous terms of trade between 
raw materials and  energy on the one hand 
and high-manufacturing industries on the 
other have a similar detrimental effect. 
Late 20th and early 21st century post-
state socialist Hungary, however, has an 
economy that is neither predominantly 
agrarian, nor dominated by exports in 
raw materials or energy. On the contrary, 
a vast majority (in 2009, over 85%) of 
Hungary’s post-state socialist exports 
consisted of machines.9 Here, we have a 
semi-peripheral, export-oriented economy 
that suffers from the lack of domestic 
growth in spite of the dominance of 
high manufacturing content industrial 
products in its exports. The explanation 
for Hungary’s inability to convert foreign 
trade involvement with economic growth 
must lie elsewhere.
A remarkable feature of Hungary’s post-
state socialist mode of entry in global trade 
is the high concentration of its exports and 
imports with the EU. As Figure 4 indi-
cates, throughout the period under study, 
the share of the EU in Hungary’s exports 
has never sunk below 75%. Between 1997 
and 2005, in fact, it remained above 80%. 
In imports, the EU’s share has hovered 
between 64.5% and 71.7%. (Imports 
from the EU are slightly lower primarily 
because of Hungary’s reliance on former 
Soviet, that is, non-EU, sources for energy, 
especially natural gas and oil.) 
To put those fi gures into perspective, the 
geopolitical concentration of Hungary’s 
foreign trade with the EU was 4.2 to 4.46 
times greater for exports, and 3.18 to 
4.23 times greater for imports than the 
EU’s share in world trade. As a result, 
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EU-Hungarian trade was 17.8 to 42 times 
more signifi cant an economic factor for 
Hungary than for the EU. Also note-
worthy is the fact that neither curve 
shows any decipherable break or change 
of tendency after 2004, suggesting that 
Hungary was already fully integrated 
into the geopolitical-economic orbit of 
the EU well before full EU membership. 
Highly concentrated foreign trade part-
nerships are another well-known problem 
for (semi-)peripheral economies (see, 
for example, Meilak 2008). The United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
(2011: 21) recommends the following 
courses of action for countries that suffer 
from high export concentration: “boost-
ing domestic demand, promoting export 
diversifi cation, strengthening regional 
trade cooperation; and [creating an] ena-
bling international trade environment”.
Until 2010, Hungary’s post-state  socialist 
governments, irrespective of their over-
all political orientation, took an extre mely 
strong pro-EU, pro-business and, specifi -
cally, pro-EU-business stance. Industrial 
policy was virtually non-existent, and 
subordination of all other issues to EU 
zones (SEZs). Because of Hungary’s early 
acceptance of the EU’s legal system, the 
entire country can be regarded as an SEZ 
for EU-based capital. 
Hungary’s post-state socialist economic 
transformation took a form, vaguely remi-
niscent of the boom of the maquiladora 
industries – electronic and machine equip-
ment assembly operations on the southern 
side of the US-Mexico border. One parti-
cularly consequential feature of foreign-
owned, assembly plant-style industrial 
growth is the relatively high import 
content of such industries. Since the two 
main points of attraction that drive multi-
national capital to such arrangements are 
low labour costs and easy logistical 
arrangements – for example, geographical 
proximity to component producers and 
export markets, or a pre-existing rail, 
road and/or water-based transportation 
system (all amply present in Hungary, 
especially from the perspective of EU-based 
capital) – local production of main com-
ponents becomes relatively low priority. 
Obviously, the value of such imports 
added to the production of such compo-
nents augments those economies where 
integration was an  unquestionable dogma. 
Because of that dogma, and because of 
the entire  Hungarian political elite’s fi rm 
ideological commitment to the inherent 
superiority of a “free”-market version of 
western capitalism over any geopolitical- 
economic alternative, the privatisation 
of the erstwhile socialist state’s property 
– including almost all productive assets 
in the economy as of 1989 – involved 
transfers, at discounted, in some cases 
extremely discounted, prices, to foreign 
investors. “Greenfi eld” investment was 
also strongly encouraged, with very sig-
nifi cant infrastructural commitments on 
part of the government, not to  mention 
the usual tax breaks. 
SEZ Country
As a result, a large part of Hungary’s GDP 
today accrues to foreign, primarily EU-
based, multinational companies. Such a 
high proportion of exports comes from 
manufacturing because of production by 
EU-based multinationals for re-export 
under conditions resembling tax- and 
tariff-free arrangements known in other 
parts of the world as special economic 
International Seminar on Organized Retailing
Call for papers
The Indian Society of Agricultural Marketing (ISAM), Centre for Economic and Social Studies (CESS), Hyderabad 
and Institute of Public Enterprises (IPE), Hyderabad are planning to organise a two-day international seminar at 
Hyderabad during September 21-22, 2012 on organized retailing, its development patterns, and likely impacts on 
farmers, processors, retailers and consumers. The focus is on the impacts on the agriculture sector and supply 
chain changes. The authors may also explore the consequences of liberalization of the foreign direct investment 
guidelines and entry of multinational chains.
We invite scholars and related individuals to contribute papers with rigorous analysis on these issues. The papers 
can be either based on fi eld based evidences or a rigorous review of the international experiences. The submitted 
papers would be reviewed before taking a fi nal decision. Authors of accepted papers will be provided air travel 
charges to participate in the seminar and will be extended local hospitality.
An abstract of not more than 250 words may be sent before June 30, 2012 and full papers before August 15, 
2012. The decision regarding papers will be informed to the paper writers by August 31, 2012. Details can be 
viewed from the website of the Indian Society of Agricultural Marketing – http://agrilmktg.org
Address for Correspondence:
Professor K. V. Reddy Dr. N. Chandrasekhara Rao
Joint Secretary Centre for Economic and Social Studies
Indian Society of Agricultural Marketing N.O. Campus, Begumpet
Centre for Economic and Social Studies Hyderabad - 500 016
N.O. Campus, Begumpet, E-mail: raonch@gmail.com
Hyderabad - 500 016, Andhra Pradesh 
E-mail: kvreddy.isam@gmail.com
COMMENTARY
Economic & Political Weekly EPW  june 9, 2012 vol xlviI no 23 25
they are produced, not where they are 
installed into the fi nal product. 
Due to the predominantly foreign own-
ership of these machine assembly indus-
tries, local income-generating  effects can 
be expected in two areas: wages of the 
workers and the local management, and 
revenues of the local subcontracting fi rms. 
Since low labour costs are a key dimension 
on which governments compete for for-
eign direct investment, and because the 
highly mechanised, high productivity 
character of this production generates rel-
atively small demand for labour, the devel-
opmental effects through wages are mini-
mal. Subcontracting arrangements put 
 local businesses in an economically,  legally 
and technologically subordinate position 
vis-à-vis foreign multi national capital. Mul-
tinationals can, and do, shop for subcon-
tractors globally, whereas local subcontrac-
tors have serious spatial and temporal con-
straints. The developmental effects of such 
subcontracting arrangements are also rela-
tively small. Given that the national indus-
try inherited from the state socialist period 
was dismantled through the privatisation 
process only to be recast as predominantly 
foreign-owned and assembly plant type, 
and given the endemic unavailability of in-
digenous capital for domestic industry, the 
highest value added operations in industri-
al production in the Hungarian economy 
are controlled by foreign capital.
Conclusion 
In some important ways, the collective 
frustration of the Hungarian failure to 
catch up is the obverse of the Greek 
debacle. In the Greek case, the shared 
currency allowed the less wealthy EU 
member state to adjust its budget and, 
specifi cally, its social policy provisions, 
to mimic those of wealthier states. Greece 
thus created the paradox of a tremendous 
over-borrowing crisis on part of the 
government, in spite of commendable 
economic growth. (Greece’s GDP rose at a 
rate higher than the GWP throughout the 
one and half decades preceding the 
current crisis.) The funds generated by 
private capital in the booming tourism 
and shipping sectors of the Greek economy 
did not get re-routed to fi nance the social 
safety net, infrastructural expenditures, 
and various other social provisions that 
society expected the state to provide. 
Domestic capital consistently refused to 
fi nance the Greek state, and within EU, 
non-Greek capital also refused to fi nance it.
The Hungarian economy has been as de-
pendent on trade with the EU as Greece, 
with one crucial difference: the absence of 
a shared currency. For that reason, the 
structural problems of the Hungarian 
economy show up not on government bal-
ance sheets but in its inability to increase 
its GDP. The “independent” Hungarian cur-
rency is hence extremely vulnerable to ex-
change rate fl uctuations, essentially de-
pressing the value of domestic labour as 
well as capital. Since the value of the Hun-
garian currency is determined almost en-
tirely outside Hungary, the government has 
extremely little room for manoeuvre to in-
fl uence processes of accumulation within 
“its” borders. The EU as a supra-state polity 
“sharing and pooling...the sovereignty of 
its member states” has, on the one hand, 
quite successfully wrestled away a large 
part of the ability of the national states to 
infl uence economic processes in “their” ter-
ritory. On the other hand, by virtue of it not 
being a state (see, for example, Böröcz and 
Sarkar 2005) – and hence not carrying the 
same moral responsibility and accountabil-
ity vis-à-vis its member states as a state 
does vis-à-vis its regions – it does not, and 
cannot be expected to, perform functions 
of the developmental state. Instead, it 
merely promises automatic prosperity 
once the driver of trade is set off.
Notes
1  The GDP and per capita GDP fi gures used in this 
article have been computed from data provided in 
the magisterial compilation of historical popula-
tion, GDP and per capita GDP estimates by eco-
nomic historian Angus Maddison (nd). For more 
on the method of computation, see Böröcz (2009).
2  For easier comparison, a horizontal line marks 
the level of the last year of state socialism in 
1989 in Figure 1.
3  The sudden drop followed by a sluggish recovery 
that is yet to reach the initial levels repeats it-
self in 24 of the 26 additional cases of post-state 
socialist transformations (Böröcz 2012). The 
two exceptions, where the recovery has already 
brought the economy slightly above the last 
state socialist position – Poland and Slovenia – 
do deserve close scrutiny. Yet, even in those 
relatively less disastrous cases, it is not possible 
to talk about a “catching-up” with western 
Europe anytime soon. 
4  For example,  “there is a strong case for moving 
towards free trade and competition among 
countries, and for building world institutions to 
apply uniform regulation, taxation, and the like 
in a fair manner and to block arbitrage based on 
uneconomic difference” (Kindleberger 1983: 637). 
5  A European Commission working document, 
states, for instance, in completely unambiguous 
terms that “[t]he triple benefi ts from trade 
opening are: [e]conomic growth [...], consumer 
benefi ts [..., and] employment” (European 
Commission 2010).
6  2008 is the latest year in Maddison’s dataset, the 
source for the GDP and per capita GDP estimates.
7  Global economic weight is an indicator of the rela-
tive infl uence of an entity on the world economy, 
measured by the per cent share of its GDP in GWP. 
For more on the rationale for such an indicator and 
the various issues in measuring it, see Böröcz (2009).
8  Figures 3 and 4 refer to “IN trade” and “OUT 
trade” because the language used in the EU for 
within-EU economic transfers avoids the conven-
tional terminology of “exports” and “imports”. So, 
in EU statistics, any EU-member state has two 
kinds of trade involving movements of goods 
 beyond its borders. Exports and imports refer to 
transactions with actors outside the 27 EU mem-
ber states; “dispatches” and “arrivals” denote 
transactions with non-national actors within the 
EU 27. Hence, in Figures 3 and 4, “IN trade” is the 
sum of “imports” and “arrivals”, “OUT trade” is 
the sum of “exports” and “dispatches”.
9  According to the CIA World Factbook, in 2009, 
Hungary’s two main exports were “machinery 
and equipment (55.3%)” and “other manufac-
tures (30.6%)”. As of 28 April 2012, https://
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/hu.html
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